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Review of Tax Treaty Practices and Policy Framework in Africa 
 
Catherine Ngina Mutava  
 
 
Summary 
 
In recent years, tax treaties concluded by sub-Saharan African countries have become more 
residence-based with fewer provisions allocating taxing rights to the source countries. This 
trend is observed in treaties signed with OECD countries in particular. For countries which 
are capital importers, as is the case with most African countries, this means that these 
countries have been slowly ceding their taxing rights over income earned within their 
jurisdiction. This could be deliberate as the countries try to attract foreign direct investment, 
or it could be the result of a lack of policy to guide treaty negotiations. In the countries we 
reviewed, the latter reason seemed to prevail. 
 
From this study, it is apparent that many sub-Saharan African countries do not have a treaty 
policy in place. The lack of a policy creates ambiguity on matters such as who should be 
involved in negotiating and concluding tax treaties, which countries are viable treaty partners, 
and the minimum tax treaty terms that a country should contend for. This provides room for 
political and elite capture of the negotiation process and leads to the conclusion of treaties 
without adequate consideration of their technical implications, which could therefore be 
detrimental to the country.  
 
A well-crafted and properly implemented treaty policy could go a long way in resolving most 
of the issues faced by sub-Saharan African countries in concluding tax treaties. The lack of 
capacity and technical understanding of tax treaties makes development of such treaty policy 
and model treaties an uphill task for most sub-Saharan African countries. Thus, there is need 
for training and capacity building in the area of tax treaties, and help in the formulation of a 
tax treaty policy and model. This training and help can come both from experts within the 
countries themselves and through external support from other countries. 
 
 
Keywords: tax treaties; tax treaty policy; tax base; source; resident; treaty negotiations. 
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Introduction 
 
Tax treaties are agreements through which two countries agree to assign and restrict taxing 
rights on economic activities that span two countries (Hearson and Kangave 2016). Tax 
treaties have been a feature of tax law for over 100 years with the first form of tax treaty 
being traced back to 1899 when Prussia and Austria concluded a tax treaty (Holmes 2014).  
 
Traditionally, tax treaties were concluded mainly for the purpose of avoiding double taxation, 
as indicated in the preamble of both the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and United Nations (UN) model tax conventions (OECD 2019a and 
UN 2018). Both conventions acknowledge in their introductory section the primary role of tax 
treaties in creating a favourable investment climate by eliminating double taxation.  
 
Treaties create a favourable environment by establishing rules that assign taxing rights on 
cross-border income between contracting states. Generally, they assign the right to tax 
income earned through active business to the source country (where the activities take 
place) and the rights to tax passive income (dividends, interest, royalties, fees for services) to 
the state of residence of the providers of capital, intellectual property or services. Where the 
income is taxable in both countries, treaties offer relief either through the credit method or the 
exemption method. The credit method allows the taxpayer to credit any tax he or she paid in 
the source country against the tax due in the resident state. The exemption method exempts 
any income that has already been taxed in the source state from being taxed in the residency 
state (Holmes 2014).  
 
The necessity of tax treaties for eliminating double taxation has been questioned. Tsilly 
Dagan argues that the assumption that, in the absence of tax treaties, double taxation would 
be inevitable is not entirely accurate. She avers that, even in the absence of a tax treaty, 
capital-exporting countries will always have an incentive to relieve double taxation unilaterally 
(Dagan 2003). According to her, many of the capital-exporting countries already offer 
unilateral relief in their domestic laws and as such, tax treaties are not necessary for 
alleviating double taxation. She captures it best when she states: 
 
Rather, they [double taxation treaties] serve much less heroic goals, such as easing 
bureaucratic hassles and coordinating tax terms between the contracting countries, 
and much more cynical goals, particularly redistributing tax revenues from the poorer to 
the richer signatory countries. (Dagan 2003: 939)   
 
Thus, whereas tax treaties may play a role in eliminating double taxation, the same could be 
achieved through domestic law, with the added benefit that the source country would not 
have to give up its taxing rights.  
 
 
1  The importance of negotiating appropriate 
treaties 
 
Where the contracting parties are equal partners with balanced economic relations, tax 
treaties are easier to negotiate, since the income lost by limiting source taxing rights on 
passive income can be offset by tax revenue from incoming flows as a resident state. 
However, where there is an economic asymmetry, as in the case of a rich, capital-exporting 
country (developed country) and a poor, capital-importing country (developing country), then 
tax treaties are unbalanced, with the treaty provisions resulting in greater tax revenue shifting 
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to the capital-exporting country to the detriment of the capital-importing country (Zolt 2018). 
As such, unlike the case of a tax treaty between two developed states, the developing 
country that signs a tax treaty with a developed one has little or no hope of offsetting the tax 
revenue loss that arises from ceding taxing rights on economic activity that takes place in 
their jurisdiction.  
 
Tax treaties are often associated with investment promotion in African countries. Even 
though a tax treaty is likely to result in some loss of tax revenues, especially for the capital-
importing countries, these countries assume that these losses will be offset by the 
investment inflows that result (Van de Poel 2016). Increased foreign direct investment (FDI), 
it is argued, results in increased technological transfer resulting in increased trade and a 
wider tax base (Osano and Koine 2016; Barthel, Busse and Neumayer 2009). Where 
attracting FDI is one of the key objectives, the tax policy should embody this objective and 
provide guidance on how this should be achieved. 
 
For some countries, this may entail adopting a policy of lowering withholding tax rates to 
avoid excessive source taxation of income, while in other cases, countries may opt to cede 
their rights to tax a particular type of income. For others, it may mean signing tax treaties to 
send a signal of their willingness to apply internationally accepted taxation norms in their 
taxation of foreign investors (Pickering 2014). Almost all tax treaties for example, contain an 
article that provides for non-discrimination of non-resident persons and in so doing, offer 
legal defence to foreign investors against any punitive tax laws that the government may 
pass against them (IMF 2014: 25).  The increased certainty and lighter taxation is supposed 
to signal an attractive investment environment for potential investors (OECD 2015, Ch. 5).  
 
Sub-Saharan African countries should be careful not to conclude tax treaties with the sole 
objective of attracting FDI. This is especially so in light of studies which indicate that the link 
between FDI and tax treaties is far from clear (IMF 2014). Notably, Baker’s recent study 
covering the period 1991-2006 shows that treaties have no effect on FDI (Baker 2014). Even 
where the treaty results in increased FDI inflows, the benefits accruing to the developing 
country may be offset by the revenue losses as a result of concessions in taxing rights since 
the net FDI flows from the developing countries can be greater than the FDI inflows. As the 
tax treaties limit the tax imposed on the outflows, the revenue loss can be much greater than 
the gains on the inflows (Baker 2014).  
 
Further, the role of treaties in signalling stability is trivial compared to other measures that a 
developing country could take in improving investment fundamentals (Brooks and Krever 
2015). Such measures include enforcing robust laws that are consistent with the rule of law 
as well as establishing an effective tax administration.   
 
Additionally, treaties may not be effective at signalling stability, and therefore attracting 
investment, due to the regional approach of most investors in relation to developing countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Most investors do not view sub-Saharan African countries individually 
but rather have a regional view of the countries (Christians 2006). In discussing this, 
Christians states: 
 
The potential for signalling a stable investment climate through tax treaties with less 
developed countries (LDCs) in Sub-Saharan Africa is especially hampered by the 
persistence of negative perceptions about this region’s investment climate. Foreign 
investors in LDCs often take a regional, rather than national, approach to investment, 
attributing the negative aspects of one country to others in the vicinity.  
(Christians 2006: 707) 
 
For example, if the countries neighbouring Rwanda are unstable, investors are unlikely to be 
greatly influenced by any tax treaties Rwanda has as the investors are likely to view Rwanda 
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as part of an unstable region and thus be less likely to invest in the country. In addition, a 
country’s history in honouring international agreements is more likely to signal its stability as 
opposed to its signing of a tax treaty. Thus, a tax treaty cannot overcome the challenges of a 
poor investment climate to attract investors to that country.   
 
It is therefore important for developing countries to have a broader objective for concluding 
tax treaties, away from the traditional roles of eliminating double taxation and giving away 
taxing rights to attract FDI since both of these can be achieved through other means.  
 
Although the main purpose of tax treaties is to prevent double taxation, the role of tax treaties 
has evolved over the years. One of the purposes of modern-day tax treaties is to prevent tax 
avoidance and evasion by blocking loopholes, adding anti-abuse provisions, and enhancing 
cooperation among tax administrations (OECD 2017). Yet despite this being touted as one of 
the main purposes served by tax treaties, treaties can contain legal loopholes that have 
made aggressive tax planning possible, resulting in base erosion and shifting of profits from 
high tax areas to low-tax areas, as well as double non-taxation (Lamers, Mcharo and 
Nakajima 2014). Tax treaties fail to take into account inconsistent definitions and 
characterisations of income by the contracting states, which creates room for tax arbitrage 
(Brooks and Krever 2015). By applying tax treaties and using complex tax structures that 
include hybrids, multinational entities (MNEs) have been able to avoid or drastically reduce 
the tax paid to source countries (Brooks and Krever 2015). The reduced tax revenues have a 
negative impact on governments, and especially those of developing countries, which leads 
to underfunding of public resources such as education which are critical for social and 
economic development. To try to meet the resultant deficit, governments in developing 
countries are forced to shift the burden to labour and consumption and in so doing increase 
the burden on the individual taxpayers.  
 
More recently, there has been research and debate on the effectiveness of tax treaties for 
both residence and source taxation. All countries have become increasingly concerned about 
tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning, including the role of tax treaties in facilitating 
such abuses. These concerns led to the major initiative to reform international tax rules, the 
project on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), launched by the OECD in 2013 and 
supported by the G20 world leaders. The resulting package of recommendations delivered in 
2015 included a multilateral convention on BEPS (MC-BEPS) to implement treaty-related 
BEPS measures.  
 
At the same time, the net impact of tax treaties on capital-importing states, especially 
developing countries, has increasingly been questioned. A study carried out by ICTD and 
ActionAid, for instance, highlighted that some of the treaties concluded between developing 
and developed countries assigned substantial taxing rights on income generated in the 
source country to the country of residence, resulting in considerable losses of potential tax 
revenues by the developing country, while the possible beneficial effects on inward 
investment were at best doubtful (ActionAid 2016; Hearson 2016). The study revealed that 
treaties signed by lower-income countries with OECD countries were particularly 
unfavourable to the low-income countries. Reduced aid and increases in population have 
increased pressure on sub-Saharan African governments to generate revenue to fund their 
development needs. Taxation provides one of the key sources of domestic revenue for these 
countries and as such their tax bases must be safeguarded and expanded.  
 
If sub-Saharan African countries are to succeed in safeguarding their tax bases, they must 
rethink their approach towards the negotiation of tax treaties. They must first determine if tax 
treaties are necessary. They must further insist on mutually beneficial outcomes, and only 
treaties whose benefits outweigh the costs should be concluded. A tax treaty policy would go 
a long way in ensuring this is achieved.  
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2  Objectives of this research paper 
 
This paper is a build-up on an already existing body of literature which indicates that tax 
treaties have resulted in significant loss of revenue, especially for developing countries, and 
that the revenue loss is not comparable to the expected benefits from foreign investment. 
Increased awareness of the impact of unfavourable tax treaties on the revenues of a state 
has seen some sub-Saharan African countries such as Zambia, Malawi, Uganda and South 
Africa cancel, suspend and or renegotiate some of their tax treaties seeking more favourable 
terms (Brooks and Krever 2015).  
 
This paper proposes that sub-Saharan African countries need to develop and implement a 
tax treaty policy framework to ensure that they safeguard their interests when concluding tax 
treaties.  
 
This paper seeks to: 
 
• understand the process of concluding tax treaties carried out by sub-Saharan African 
countries and, specifically, whether these countries tend to have a framework in place 
to guide tax treaty negotiations;  
• discuss the objectives of a tax treaty policy for developing countries; and 
• make recommendations on how to formulate a tax treaty policy.  
 
 
3  Methodology and findings 
 
3.1 Process 
 
The process entailed a desktop review of the existing body of literature on the history of tax 
treaties and their impact on developing countries in Africa. A sample of tax treaties was 
reviewed, concluded by a sample of sub-Saharan African countries with developed countries 
and tax havens. The tax treaty review helped establish whether the countries follow a 
particular model convention, and the rights given up under such treaties. The ICTD/ActionAid 
treaty dataset aided in the analysis and the comparison of the treaties vis-à-vis the UN and 
OECD Model Conventions. 
 
To understand what informs the tax treaty negotiation process, key stakeholders in the treaty 
negotiation and implementation process were interviewed. The interviewees included 
government officials drawn from the revenue authorities as well as the ministries of finance 
and treasuries in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana, South Africa and Mauritius. A 
total of 15 persons were interviewed. The choice of the interviewees was based on their 
involvement in negotiating tax treaties for their respective countries, with only persons who 
are/have been involved being interviewed. The interviews were semi-structured to guide the 
conversation, with a focus on the whole treaty negotiation process, starting from the 
formulation of policies that inform the treaties, the choice of treaty partners, the selection of 
the team involved in the negotiations, how the negotiations are conducted, as well as the 
country’s involvement in the BEPs process. This was to give room to the interviewees to 
express themselves on the challenges they faced in negotiations. The interviews were 
carried out from May 2017 to April 2018. Some interviews were carried out in person while 
others were carried out via telephone conversations. Additional information was provided 
during a seminar organised by ICTD and held at Strathmore University in April 2018 to 
discuss tax treaties in sub-Saharan Africa. The seminar drew participants from various 
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countries in sub-Saharan Africa including but not limited to the countries that are the subject 
of this study. 
  
3.2 Findings on tax treaty negotiations – the experience of selected sub-
Saharan African countries 
 
Of the countries reviewed, South Africa, Mauritius and Ghana currently have a tax treaty 
policy in place that guides their treaty negotiations. At the time that this research was 
conducted, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda did not have such a policy but were in 
the process of developing their treaty policies. Two countries proved to be distinct: South 
Africa and Mauritius. South Africa’s choice of model varies according to the treaty partner. 
South Africa is a capital exporter to African countries and thus, according to the official we 
interviewed, will mostly rely on the OECD Model when negotiating with other African 
countries, with a few deviations on permanent establishment (PE) and pension provisions.1 
When negotiating with OECD countries, in relation to which it is a capital importer, South 
Africa will normally demand certain provisions contained in the UN Model.  
 
Mauritius has a wide treaty network and has over the years sought to market itself as a 
‘treaty hub’ intermediary jurisdiction for investors, first into India and more recently into Africa. 
A review of its treaties suggests that these are informed by this need rather than the need to 
protect its tax base. Mauritius is thus not consistent in the model it uses but rather this is 
determined by its treaty partner. The review further indicates that Mauritius is keen to retain 
the right to tax capital gains, notably by excluding any treaty provision allowing source 
country taxation of the disposal of shares in companies owning immovable assets.  
 
The other countries reviewed showed little consistency on the choice of the model, with most 
accepting both the OECD and UN Models as their negotiation starting point (Dauver and 
Krever 2014). 
 
Analysis of the ICTD/ActionAid treaty dataset by Hearson has shown that over recent years, 
treaties concluded by sub-Saharan African countries with OECD members have become 
more residence-based, with fewer provisions allocating taxing rights to the source countries 
(Hearson 2016). For countries which are capital importers, as is the case with most sub-
Saharan African countries, this means that they have been slowly ceding their taxing rights 
over income earned within their jurisdiction. This could be deliberate as the countries try to 
attract FDI, or it could be the result of a lack of policy to guide treaty negotiations. In the 
countries reviewed for this paper, the latter reason seemed to prevail. 
 
Interviewees from countries that did not have a treaty policy in place observed that lack of a 
policy created ambiguity on matters such as who should be involved in negotiating and 
concluding tax treaties, which countries are viable treaty partners, and the minimum tax 
treaty terms that a country should contend for.2 In some of the countries that do not have a 
treaty policy, it is unclear who can or should be involved in the treaty negotiation process. 
Some of the interviewees who work in the treaty departments of the revenue authorities, 
which are responsible for applying the treaties, stated there were instances where treaties 
were negotiated and concluded without them even being aware that such a process had 
commenced.3 They only found out once the treaty was made public.4 Such secrecy, they 
argued, provides room for elite capture of the negotiation process and leads to the 
conclusion of treaties without adequate consideration of their technical implications, which 
 
1  Interview with official from South Africa Ministry of Finance. 
2 Interviews with officials from country A. In some of the cases mentioned in this section, there was one interview with 
each official; in others, there were multiple interviews with more than one official. 
3  Interviews with officials from country A. 
4  Interview with revenue officials from country A 
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could therefore be detrimental to the country.5 This is especially so in many sub-Saharan 
African countries where politics and the elite are closely linked and as such the elite can use 
their political influence to protect their interests. The officials further opined that the lack of a 
written policy allowed for elite influence in treaty negotiations resulting, in some cases, in 
countries negotiating treaties with tax havens or with countries with which they had few or no 
economic ties. This, according to the interviewees, arose where politicians had economic 
interests that would benefit if a treaty was concluded with a particular country.6 Due to 
political influence, some tax treaty negotiations are conducted very speedily, not allowing 
enough time for consultation with relevant experts and without a tax policy document to guide 
on acceptable minimum standards. Hence, the treaties end up being quite unfavourable to 
the country.  
 
The officials interviewed were of the view that tax treaties were used, in some instances, as 
tools for cementing diplomatic ties, without considering the economic impact of the treaties 
on the tax base.7 In many instances, the treaties were used as a tool to attract FDI despite 
the lack of evidence directly linking tax treaties with the level of FDI. The lack of 
understanding by some of the negotiators on the impact of tax treaties on the tax base and 
their overall impact on the economy was further compounded in some of the countries by the 
exclusion of the tax administration from the negotiation process, with a number of the 
countries only involving officials from the treasury and the ministry of foreign affairs.  
 
Furthermore, the lack of a policy document made oversight on treaty negotiation processes 
an almost impossible task as there were no criteria which parliament or any other oversight 
authority could use to check if the correct process was followed or if the treaty is beneficial 
for the country. 
 
In countries where tax treaty policies existed, implementation was cited to be a big 
challenge.8 In some countries, for instance, the treaty policy document is not readily available 
even to some parties who are involved in the treaty negotiation process, making it impossible 
for those involved in the process to know how and with whom to negotiate treaties.9 
 
From the findings, the officials felt that they needed more guidance on how and what to 
negotiate for. They also felt they needed protection from the whims of the executive as well 
as greater negotiating power. The interviewees indicated that sometimes, due to political 
reasons, they had been forced to negotiate treaties at short notice and within a very short 
period. An interviewee expressed frustration at having been required to negotiate and 
conclude a treaty within days despite not having been given time to carry out research on the 
treaty partner. In such instances, he said, a negotiator can only do their best to get the bare 
minimum and not cede all taxing rights.10 
 
This paper proposes that in order for sub-Saharan African countries to safeguard their 
interests when concluding tax treaties, they must put in place mechanisms to guide and 
direct the entire tax treaty negotiation process. Such mechanisms include: 
 
(i) a tax treaty policy; 
(ii) a country model tax treaty; and 
(iii) a tax treaty negotiating strategy.  
 
 
 
5  Interview with ministry officials from country B. 
6 Interviews with officials from countries A, B, C, D and E. 
7  Interviews with officials from countries A, B and E. 
8  Interviews with officials from countries A and B. 
9  Interview with officials from country A. 
10  Interview with official from country B. 
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4  Tax treaty policy: its role 
 
As already discussed, since tax treaties shift taxing rights and can erode the tax base, 
developing countries should take pause before concluding any. They should first determine 
whether tax treaties are necessary for them and which countries they should sign with. 
Brumby and Keen (2016) report that Stephen Shay, senior lecturer at Harvard Law School, 
recommended that: 
 
Developing economies should be sceptical as to whether benefits of a bilateral income 
tax treaty program outweigh costs, and any one treaty should be considered ‘a 
potential treaty with the world’: if a country has ten treaties… investors will take 
advantage of the ‘worst’ one. 
 
A tax treaty policy is a critical document that ensures a country’s interests are protected. It 
provides guidance and gives clarity to the treaty negotiators on how to conduct the process. 
The treaty policy should have as its foundation the reasons why the country seeks to expand 
its treaty network. Each country has motives for doing so, which may be both political and 
economic. Based on the country’s objectives for concluding tax treaties, the policy should 
also stipulate how the intended objectives will be achieved (Brumby and Keen 2016). 
 
This section discusses in detail the critical role of a tax treaty policy in addressing the 
challenges encountered by sub-Saharan African countries when negotiating treaties, which 
often result in unfavourable outcomes. 
 
4.1 Protecting the domestic tax base 
 
One of the main objectives of a tax treaty policy is to ensure that a country’s tax and 
economic interests are protected. Although the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion is 
now stated to be one of the main purposes served by tax treaties, treaties still contain legal 
loopholes that have made aggressive tax planning possible, resulting in base erosion and 
shifting of profits as well as double non-taxation (Lamers et al. 2014). If the interaction with 
the domestic tax system is not taken into account at the negotiation stage, the conclusion of 
tax treaties can result in inconsistent definitions and characterisations of income by the 
contracting states, thereby creating room for tax arbitrage (Brooks and Krever 2015). By 
exploiting these inconsistencies and using complex tax structures, for example using hybrid 
entities or instruments, MNEs can avoid or drastically reduce the tax paid to source 
countries.11 For example, where treaties are signed with low-tax jurisdictions and lack 
adequate provisions limiting benefits to genuine residents of the partner state, it may result in 
‘round-tripping’ and treaty shopping. Round-tripping arises where local investors route their 
investments through the low-tax jurisdiction in order to avoid tax and in so doing erode the 
domestic tax base. Treaty shopping on the other hand arises where a person who is not a 
resident of either contracting state to a treaty establishes an entity in one of the contracting 
states for purposes of obtaining the treaty benefits. A study by the IMF indicates that treaties 
signed with investment hubs such as Mauritius and the Netherlands result in treaty shopping 
and in investments being re-routed through the hubs in order to take advantage of the treaty 
benefits. These investment hubs have wide treaty networks, do not levy withholding taxes on 
outflow of income, have few substance requirements and have low taxes on income. This, 
the study finds, attracts intermediate holding companies that make use of debt, intellectual 
property and other schemes to shift profits to the low-tax jurisdictions. Such re-routing, the 
 
11  A hybrid entity is one that is treated as transparent in one jurisdiction and non-transparent in another jurisdiction. For 
example, Holdco would be treated as a partnership and therefore transparent in country A and as a corporation and 
therefore non-transparent in country B. A hybrid instrument on the other hand is one that is treated differently in different 
jurisdictions. For example, it may be treated as equity in one jurisdiction and as debt in another jurisdiction (OECD 
2012).   
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study finds, often results in tax avoidance, with sub-Saharan countries estimated to suffer 
losses of 15 per cent of corporate income tax (Beer and Loeprick 2018). 
 
A lack of appreciation of the impact of tax treaties on a country’s tax revenues and overall 
economy was noted as a leading cause in the conclusion of politically motivated treaties. A 
well-crafted treaty policy can address this by setting out the rationale for concluding treaties 
and requiring an analysis of the impact of tax treaties not only on domestic revenue 
mobilisation but also on the economy (Lang and Owens 2014). An assessment of the impact 
of tax treaties on the economy is useful in creating awareness among government officials as 
well as parliament of what the country stands to lose when they agree to unfavourable 
treaties. It thus ensures that only treaties whose benefits outweigh the cost are concluded.  
 
A good treaty policy will seek to ensure that treaties are concluded where the country retains 
as wide source taxing rights as possible. A treaty policy outlines the main policy outcomes 
that a country aims to achieve from tax treaties by establishing targets that are (i) optimal for 
the country; (ii) an acceptable compromise; and (iii) outcomes that must be achieved in every 
negotiation (Pickering 2014).  
 
In determining which terms to include in the treaty, due regard must be given to sectors that 
are key to a country’s economy and to whether the country has the capacity to administer the 
treaty. For example, a country that is a net importer of technical services, as is the case with 
most sub-Saharan African countries, can provide in the treaty policy that an article on 
taxation of technical services must be contained in the treaty.  
 
By providing for negotiable and non-negotiable terms in the treaties, the policy empowers 
and guides the negotiators in concluding treaties that protect the tax base of the country. 
Where a non-negotiable term is rejected by the other state, negotiators have the confidence 
and authority to walk away from the negotiations. Most of the interviewees from the countries 
that did not have a tax treaty policy cited frustration at not having the confidence to reject 
terms that were not beneficial to their countries. A tax policy would go a long way to giving 
the negotiators the much-needed authority to do so. 
 
Tax treaties are generally expected to be long-term binding agreements. Withdrawal from an 
existing tax treaty may negatively impact investors who have already factored the treaty 
terms into their business models. However, there are instances where a country should 
renegotiate or even withdraw a tax treaty to safeguard its interests. A treaty policy stipulates 
instances where a country may withdraw or seek to renegotiate a tax treaty. 
 
4.2 Provide a framework for developing a country model tax treaty 
 
The treaty policy further provides a basis for developing a country’s model tax treaty which 
reflects its preferences with respect to provisions on the various clauses contained in the tax 
treaties. While countries are encouraged to adhere to the provisions of international model 
conventions as much as possible (the UN Model in the case of developing countries), a 
country’s model treaty reflects its own preference on treaty provisions, which is especially 
important where the intended policy outcomes vary from those envisaged in the international 
treaty model (Pickering 2014).   
 
The UN Model is recommended as a reference model for developing countries since it 
provides for greater taxing rights in source countries. However, depending on the rights that 
a country is keen to protect, the country can make additional changes to the UN Model to 
protect such rights. Though preferred by most developing countries, the UN Model should be 
viewed as a preferred outcome rather than a start point for treaty negotiations. Since 
negotiations often result in concessions and the UN Model is already a compromise position, 
if used as a start point for negotiations, it is likely to result in developing countries ceding 
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more taxing rights than is desirable. Thus, it would be better for developing countries to 
prepare their own model capturing what they consider to be most important to them. In 
developing the model, the countries can be guided by the UN Model and the African Tax 
Administration Forum (ATAF) Model. 
 
4.3 How to identify treaty partners 
 
Sub-Saharan African countries tend to be reactive in their choice of treaty partners, with most 
negotiating with the countries that request a treaty rather than choosing a treaty partner that 
meets a pre-determined criterion. A number of the interviewees indicated that their countries 
would conclude a treaty with any country that requested one. According to the officials of 
most countries interviewed, when the officials of another state came into the country for an 
official visit and requested a treaty, one would almost certainly be concluded.  
 
The treaty policy can remedy this by establishing the criteria that must be met for a country to 
qualify as a treaty partner. The criteria set out in the policy empowers government officials to 
decline negotiations with a country that does not meet the required conditions. Treaties 
should only be concluded where there are sufficient economic partnerships. The assessment 
is also useful in identifying challenges that are likely to arise from the investment and trade 
between the two countries. If these can be solved under domestic legislation, then there may 
not be a need to conclude a tax treaty (Thuronyi 2010). Countries should consider 
concluding agreements that address specific issues not covered in domestic legislation, e.g. 
agreements for exchange of information and cooperation in tax matters. 
 
4.4 Provide clarity on who should negotiate treaties 
 
Some of the interviewees indicated a lack of consistency in the persons allowed to negotiate 
tax treaties. In some cases, it was treasury officials, while in others it was revenue authority 
officials.12 A change in negotiators creates room for inconsistencies in the negotiation 
process and makes the process opaque, making it difficult to ensure that those with relevant 
knowledge and experience are involved. A tax policy would go a long way in clarifying this 
and ensuring there is transparency in the process.  
 
The treaty policy should specify which government department (negotiating authority) will 
have the power to authorise treaty negotiations.13 The UN recommends inclusion of tax 
administrators in the tax treaty negotiating process (where domestic legislation permits). As 
implementers of the treaty, they can advise on problems experienced in administering some 
treaty provisions (United Nations 2019). South Africa, for example, requires both the revenue 
authority and the treasury to be involved in treaty negotiations. Due to the diplomatic 
importance of treaties, it may be prudent to involve the ministry of foreign affairs in order to 
ensure that the negotiations align with the country’s foreign policy (United Nations 2019). 
 
Developing countries are advised to consider seeking technical advice from consultants who 
are treaty experts if such skills are lacking in government and where the domestic law 
permits it (United Nations 2019). The final team that is mandated to negotiate tax treaties can 
then be divided into those who will do the actual negotiations and those who will provide 
technical support through research such as research on the potential partner’s tax system, 
economic position, and investment flows, among others. 
 
 
 
 
 
12  Interview with officials from country A. 
13  Ibid. 
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4.5 Ensure transparency and guard against sectional/political interests  
 
By providing guidance on key aspects of treaty negotiations, a tax treaty policy creates 
transparency and consistency in the process and in so doing prevents capture by sectional 
interests. A number of interviewees gave examples of times they have been forced to 
negotiate a treaty with leaders from another country who have come into the country for a 
state visit. In such cases, the negotiators were unaware of the visit and, as such, ill-prepared 
for the negotiations.14  
 
These negotiations, they added, had to be concluded in less than a week, giving them little 
time to carry out the requisite research and consultation.15 To prevent situations where the 
executive demands, for political reasons, the conclusion of a treaty within a short period, the 
treaty policy can contain as part of the framework the need to carry out research on the 
potential treaty partner, their tax system and the expected impact of the treaty on the tax 
base. 
 
Transparency in treaty negotiations, both internally as well as externally, is important for sub-
Saharan African states. Internally, a tax treaty policy provides a means for parliament or any 
other oversight body to exercise oversight and ensure that the negotiation process has been 
conducted in line with the treaty policy and that the minimum specified outcomes were 
achieved. Government officials who do not adhere to the treaty policy guidelines can be held 
accountable. 
 
Externally, a treaty policy can provide transparency for the negotiating partners as it allows 
the negotiators to communicate the non-negotiable terms in advance (United Nations 2019). 
This reduces the amount of time spent negotiating about such terms.  
 
 
5  What should inform a tax treaty policy? 
 
As stated, tax treaty policies are of great import in guiding countries in their treaty 
negotiations. These policies contain the justification for negotiating and concluding tax 
treaties. Sub- Saharan African countries need to take into account various factors when 
designing their treaty policies. These include economic circumstances, existing domestic 
policies and available technical capacity, as further discussed below. 
 
5.1 The country’s economic status 
 
A tax treaty policy should take into account a country’s economic circumstances, particularly 
the key economic sectors which contribute significantly to domestic revenue as well as those 
with potential for growth, and the nature and levels of inbound and outbound investments 
and trade. Due consideration must be given to the country’s main revenue sources and how 
the same can be protected (Pickering 2014). The African Development Bank estimates that 
Africa holds 30 per cent of global mineral reserves, eight per cent of oil reserves and seven 
per cent of natural gas reserves (African Development Bank 2016). In view of this, sub-
Saharan African countries should ensure that they safeguard taxing rights on the income and 
capital gains from immovable property.  
 
An assessment of the country’s level of investment and trade flows (inbound and outbound) 
is also an important policy consideration as it helps determine the economic relevance of 
concluding a tax treaty with a particular country. Assessment of trade flows also informs the 
 
14  Interviews with officials from countries A, B and D. 
15  Interviews with officials from countries A, B, D and E. 
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treaty provisions to negotiate for. For instance, since Ghana is a net importer, it insists that a 
technical service clause is mandatory in all its treaties. In the case of South Africa, the choice 
of model is determined by the country it is negotiating with. It adopts the OECD guidelines 
when negotiating treaties with sub-Saharan African countries (since it is a net exporter to 
Africa) and adopts UN terms when negotiating with developing countries (since it is a net 
importer from developed countries). 
  
5.2 The country’s tax policy  
 
The domestic tax policy and the tax treaty policy must be aligned to ensure that they work in 
tandem, do not conflict, and that treaty terms are enforceable under domestic laws. Where 
the domestic tax policy seeks to promote a certain sector, the tax treaty policy should take 
this into account and not provide treaty terms that give undue advantages to foreign firms 
over local firms. For instance, failing to tax fees paid to foreign providers of technical services 
may disadvantage local providers of similar services. It is also recommended that while 
drafting the treaty policy, a country should be forward-looking by taking into account taxation 
that is currently not in place but is likely to be enacted in future e.g. although a country may 
not currently be exploiting natural resources, it should seek to retain appropriate source 
country taxing rights on immovable property to protect future revenue. These forward-looking 
treaties can be achieved by ensuring that treaty negotiators are technically equipped and are 
up-to-date on emerging tax issues in other markets and globally.  
 
5.3 The objectives of other existing policies 
 
Tax treaties are not purely economic instruments. The tax treaty policy should be aligned 
with other key objectives such as diplomatic policy and the country’s economic policy. 
Although it is not recommended, tax treaties can be concluded for political reasons. For 
example, during the apartheid era South Africa had a policy of signing a tax treaty with any 
country that would allow them to open an embassy.16 This was a case of foreign policy 
determining the treaty partner. Care should be taken even in such instances that the treaty 
concluded is consistent with the overall objective of the treaty policy and does not cede too 
many taxing rights to the other state.  
 
5.4 The main stakeholders 
 
At present, the process of negotiating tax treaties in many countries reviewed is opaque and 
in some instances news about a concluded treaty is received from the media. It is important 
to involve key stakeholders in the formulation of the policy so as to ensure that the policy 
reflects the interests of the country, and in so doing prevent elite capture of the process 
(Moerland 2017). Though treaties have a direct impact on all the citizens in the country, it is 
unlikely that most will have the technical capacity to actively engage in discussions on treaty 
policy. The main stakeholders that can be consulted include corporate players making cross-
border investments. They can help determine the type of investment being made and 
therefore the type of taxes likely to be levied.17 Other stakeholders include the revenue 
authority, since they are the main implementors of the treaties and are likely to have an 
understanding of the impact of a treaty on the country’s revenues. Civil society also plays a 
key role as they are likely to represent the interests of the public and to prevent state 
capture. Technical experts in the area can provide technical expertise on the subject. Some 
revenue officials noted that one of the main sources of disputes with respect to treaties is 
differences in technical interpretation of certain treaty provisions between the authority itself 
and corporate taxpayers and tax advisors.18 Engagement of these stakeholders in policy 
 
16  This was discussed during ICTD Tax Treaties Seminar held at Strathmore University in 2018.  
17  Lutando Mvovo, presentation at the ICTD Tax Treaties Seminar, Strathmore University, 2018. 
18  Discussions during the ICTD Tax Treaties Seminar, Strathmore University, 2018 
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formulation will ensure that the tax treaty policy is enriched, that ambiguity is eliminated when 
drafting treaties, and that treaties will gain legitimacy.  
 
5.5 The cost of treaty negotiation and implementation 
 
The cost of tax collection as a proportion of total tax revenue is high in sub-Saharan Africa 
with countries such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe reporting at 5.2 per cent and four per cent 
respectively in 2016 (African Tax Outlook 2018). Tax treaties require resources to negotiate 
and implement in addition to potential revenue lost from giving up taxing rights, and from the 
abuse of treaties. Such costs include building the capacity of treaty negotiators and revenue 
authorities, the administrative costs of enforcing some treaty provisions such as exchange of 
information, the collection of taxes pursuant to the cooperation in tax matters agreement, and 
the cost of resolving disputes through the mutual agreement procedure (Pickering 2014). 
 
It is important for sub-Saharan African countries to evaluate the associated costs of 
negotiating and implementing a tax treaty against the expected benefits. This may, for 
instance, raise the bar when establishing the criteria for choosing a treaty partner. It may also 
inform when other alternative agreements, such as exchange of information agreements, 
should be considered, as well as what terms are administratively feasible to implement. 
 
 
6  Negotiating strategy 
 
Sub-Saharan African countries need to design a negotiating strategy to enable them to 
achieve their treaty policy objectives. To begin with, the negotiators must understand the 
country’s objectives and expected outcomes as outlined in the treaty policy (Pickering 2014; 
United Nations 2019). 
 
Most negotiations between developed and developing countries often result in unequal 
exchange, with developing countries giving more concessions. Several reasons have been 
cited for such outcomes, ranging from inadequate resources (lack of experienced negotiators 
and of crucial information in developing countries) coupled with aggressive demands by the 
developed countries (Nkot 2014). An example is tax treaty negotiation with a number of 
developed countries that demand the inclusion of a ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) clause. The 
MFN clause provides that should the country agree on a lower rate with a third country that is 
similar to the existing treaty partner, it must provide similar treatment to the existing trade 
partner (United Nations 2019).  
 
While some scholars hold that perceptions of power between the negotiating parties 
significantly impact negotiation outcomes (with the perceived powerful party prevailing over 
the weak), other scholars believe that since negotiations are about specific issues and 
interests, negotiations conducted with skill and tact can significantly reduce disparities in the 
outcomes, regardless of the powers involved (Salacuse 2003). A well-crafted negotiating 
strategy is crucial, especially for developing countries, which are often perceived as the 
weaker party in negotiations with developed countries. The negotiating strategy provides 
practical guidance to treaty negotiators on how to conduct the negotiations in order to 
achieve the intended treaty outcomes.  
 
6.1 Pre-negotiation 
 
The preparations made prior to commencement of the negotiations form an important part of 
the negotiation strategy. Once it is determined which section of government has the authority 
to negotiate treaties, the country should set out to build capacity among the negotiators. 
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Technical as well as soft skills training is key in helping the negotiators represent the 
country’s best interests. Technical skills include knowledge of tax and of treaty terms, and 
some understanding of the economic implications of the treaty, the domestic legislative 
processes in concluding treaties, the interaction of the tax treaty with domestic tax legislation, 
among others. Soft skills may include negotiation and drafting skills. It might be worthwhile 
for the country to build capacity in the area of drafting. This skill is useful in capturing what 
was agreed during the negotiations and reducing this into the technical treaty terms.  
 
The negotiating team should carry out an analysis of the economic importance and impact of 
a tax treaty with a prospective partner. This should be guided by the tax treaty policy which 
helps in determining the selection of treaty partners. Such analysis may include an 
examination of the investment flows between the prospective treaty partners to determine if a 
treaty is indeed required and would be beneficial. The analysis should extend to the likely 
impact of the treaty on revenue flows as well as on the economy. Similarly, there should be 
consultation with the business community on the tax challenges they are currently facing in 
trading with the prospective treaty partner. Based on the analysis and the consultations, the 
negotiating authority should determine if indeed a treaty is necessary or if the domestic law is 
sufficient to address these challenges. A brief should be prepared on why the treaty is 
necessary and how it will address the challenges. This information is useful in helping the 
negotiating team determine the aims of the negotiation (Salacuse 2003).  
 
If the analysis indicates that a treaty is desirable, the negotiators should research the tax 
system of the potential treaty partner as well as the treaties it has signed to gain an 
understanding of what the other country is likely to ask for during negotiations. As stated 
above, it would be helpful for countries to prepare their own model to guide the treaty 
negotiations. Based on this model, the negotiation team can produce a draft text and agree 
on the terms that are negotiable, those that are non-negotiable, and those that are not 
particularly important to the country. Where the team decides to deviate from the model, they 
should set out in advance the alternatives that they will be requesting in the negotiations. 
 
The negotiating team should then select the individuals who will carry out the negotiations 
and assign the roles to be played by each team member (United Nations 2019). The team 
should be comprised of members with the requisite technical knowledge and experience in 
all stages of the negotiation process (Nogues 2004). At a minimum, the negotiating team 
should have a technical expert in international tax matters who is also experienced in tax 
treaty negotiations (Nogues 2004). Where possible, the team should include a less 
experienced member so as to build capacity (Mann 2015). The negotiating team should 
prepare adequately for each negotiation. They should for instance be well informed about 
their country’s circumstances (such as the country’s key resources and what it has to offer 
the treaty partner) (Nogues 2004), and the relevant tax legislations and economic policies. 
They should also understand the content and basis of their country’s draft/model treaty 
provisions, the justification for treaty provisions which diverge from the international norms, 
treaty terms concluded with other countries, and any justification for exceptionally beneficial 
clauses with a particular country (Pickering 2014). 
 
The team should be sensitised on the culture of the other country (Pickering 2014). The team 
leader should be experienced and command the respect of the rest of the team. She or he 
should have a good understanding of her or his team as well as their strengths and areas of 
expertise (Pickering 2014).  
 
6.2 Negotiations 
 
The two countries should agree on how, where and when to carry out the negotiations. 
Details of the place and time of the negotiations, as well as the language to be used to carry 
out the negotiations, should be agreed at the beginning. Once these details are agreed, the 
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negotiating team should seek to be disciplined and adhere to these rules. To increase their 
negotiating power, the team should have limited negotiating autonomy. Their autonomy is 
limited by the preferences of their country, as documented in the treaty policy. The clearer 
the intended goal of the country is, the less autonomy the negotiator has and therefore the 
less likely they are to concede on an issue that is against the preferences of their country.  
 
It is argued that all treaty negotiations take place at two levels: at the domestic level and at 
the international level (with the foreign counterpart) (Moerland 2017). For a treaty to be 
concluded, there must be an intersection between the domestic preferences and the 
demands of the foreign counterpart (Clark, Duchesne and Meunier 2000). Thus, the 
domestic preferences of a country (defined as what will make the constituents happy) 
(Putnam 1988), where clearly determined, guide and bind the negotiator, leaving little room 
for the perceived stronger state to impose its position on the negotiator and the perceived 
weaker state. Where, however, the negotiator is given wide negotiating autonomy, they can 
be easily pushed into conceding terms that may not be preferable to their country. When 
negotiating with countries where there is economic asymmetry, as with developed states, 
developing countries can employ a ‘tied hands’ strategy. This involves hiding behind 
domestic preferences as the reason for not conceding (Fearon 1997). In this case, the tax 
treaty policy document could act as the source of the constraint and in so doing limit the 
autonomy of the negotiators. An independent impact assessment of the effects of the treaty if 
concluded could also act as a constraint and build up on the tied hands negotiation strategy 
(Moerland 2017). 
 
6.3 Post-negotiations 
 
To prevent abuse of the treaty-making process by politicians and the elite, the draft treaty 
agreed upon by the two countries should be submitted for comments to an oversight body 
such as parliament and/or to a committee of experts which has authority from parliament to 
review treaties (United Nations 2019). This ensures accountability in the negotiation process 
and acts as a measure to ensure that only treaties whose benefits outweigh the costs are 
signed. Where the oversight body raises legitimate questions on the benefit of the draft treaty 
to the country, the process of ratification can be stopped, and the negotiators can go back to 
the table to discuss the same. South Africa for example, submits such drafts to its 
parliamentary finance committee and only upon this committee being satisfied as to the 
benefits of the treaty, is the treaty signed. This prevents the need for renegotiation after the 
treaty has come into effect which is often a difficult and expensive process. Since most 
members of parliament in most countries do not have the requisite technical knowledge on 
tax matters, it may be worthwhile for the government to consider setting up a technical tax 
committee that advises parliament on treaty matters.  
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Box 1 
 
 
7  Conclusion  
 
The general lack of consistency in treaties concluded by sub-Saharan African countries, 
whether with OECD or non-OECD countries, reveals that most of these countries do not 
have a tax treaty policy that informs their treaty negotiation. As such, the actual text adopted 
is sometimes determined not by the needs of the country but by the partner with whom they 
are negotiating and the terms that it dictates. This is especially so when the negotiators are 
under pressure to conclude a treaty due to political reasons. It is essential that sub-Saharan 
African countries develop a treaty policy and a negotiating strategy that outline their minimum 
acceptable treaty terms which should be applicable in all treaties to safeguard their interests. 
This should provide guidance for negotiators that ensures consistency and accountability in 
the negotiation and conclusion of tax treaties. Further, the policy should indicate the factors 
to consider in the choice of a treaty partner. These countries should bear in mind that tax is 
not the greatest motivator for location of businesses. Rather, other factors such as markets, 
legal protection, economic and political stability among others rank higher, and so they 
should focus on improving these areas rather than concluding lopsided treaties that have an 
adverse impact on their tax base.  
 
Further, there is need to build capacity among tax treaty negotiators in sub-Saharan African 
countries. The interviews conducted revealed that in some cases there was only one person 
in the relevant ministry or revenue authority who was knowledgeable on matters relating to 
tax treaties. The treaty negotiations were unbalanced, with the teams from developed 
countries having far greater knowledge and understanding of tax treaties, placing the 
developing country at a great disadvantage. Sub-Saharan African countries seeking to 
negotiate tax treaties should ensure that their negotiation teams are well trained and have 
the authority to walk away if the treaty terms are not favourable to the country. Further, 
oversight bodies should be empowered to review tax treaties and they should be well trained 
if they are to play their role well. This can be achieved if there is a treaty policy which takes 
into account the peculiar circumstances of the country as well as an analysis of the potential 
impact of treaties on tax revenue. 
 
Parliamentary oversight of treaties in Kenya 
 
Recently, the constitutionality of the Kenya-Mauritius tax treaty was challenged for, among 
other reasons, lack of public participation. In its judgment, the High Court of Kenya held 
that double taxation arrangements (DTAs) are not treaties and therefore need not be 
subjected to the ratification process that involves the tabling of DTAs before Parliament. 
However, the Legal Notice that brings into effect the DTA itself should be laid before 
Parliament. This distinction between the treatment of the DTA itself and of the Legal 
Notice effectively gives the executive greater leeway to conclude DTAs without much 
scrutiny since the ruling affirms that any such scrutiny can only be at the tail end after the 
treaty has been concluded, as that is when the Legal Notice is tabled before Parliament. 
By that point, the DTA has already been signed and it is unlikely that much in the DTA can 
or will be changed by Parliament. By requiring the Legal Notice to be tabled before 
Parliament, the judgment is a win, albeit a small one, for accountability in the area of 
DTAs. However, the DTA itself is not subject to the same kind of scrutiny, and much more 
still needs to be done to place checks on the powers of the executive to conclude treaties 
that can have an adverse impact on the country’s tax base. 
 
21 
 
Finally, it has been argued that sub-Saharan African countries lack bargaining power in 
negotiating tax treaties. In light of this, these countries should take advantage of the current 
global efforts to reduce incidences of BEPS by signing on to the MC-BEPS. As of 30 October 
2019, 12 African countries had signed the MC-BEPS with more expected to sign in the near 
future (OECD 2019b). From interviews conducted for this study, the MC-BEPS is seen by 
most of the countries under review as a welcome initiative as it will provide a faster and more 
efficient means of amending existing treaties. The officials noted that the normal process of 
amending an existing treaty is often lengthy and expensive. In any case, most treaty 
partners, especially OECD countries, are unwilling to engage in bilateral negotiations due to 
the number of treaty partners involved and the stringent timelines within which they must 
comply with the OECD BEPS minimum standards. Consequently, sub-Saharan African 
countries seeking to amend treaties which they deem to be unfavourable, especially treaties 
made with OECD countries, should take advantage and sign the MC-BEPS. The MC-BEPS 
deals with the treaty abuse that has become rampant. A number of the measures contained 
in the MC-BEPS were included in the amended UN and OECD Models. However, while the 
Models are effective in dealing with future negotiations, the MC-BEPS offers countries a 
chance to seal loopholes contained in already concluded treaties. The MC-BEPS provides 
various anti-abuse measures. 
 
Sub-Saharan African countries must realise that it is not only important to have a wide treaty 
network, but vital that the treaties they conclude do not erode their tax base and that their 
interests are always protected. Thus, it is imperative that prior to commencing negotiations, 
the country must know what they want and what they are willing to cede (Pickering 2014). To 
ensure consistency and accountability, this knowledge must be documented in a policy 
document that provides guidance on all matters pertaining to treaty negotiations. 
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